Why do some governments have more environmentally friendly policies than others? Part of the answer involves governing parties' ideological positions on environmentalism and the constraints imposed by executive institutions. This paper elaborates this party-based explanation and tests it with uniquely comparable indicators of national environmental policies for governments in 27 countries in the European Union. The findings show that governments with parties that emphasized environmental protection in their manifestos are more likely to propose pro-environment policies during EU-level negotiations. However, the effect of ideology is mediated by the centralization of the national executive branch. In centralized national executives the environmental positions of prime ministers' parties affect policies, while in decentralized national executives the positions of environment ministers' parties are relevant. The findings have implications for understanding the impact of parties' environmental positions on government policies, as well as for policymaking in coalitions more generally.
election campaigns is also relevant to many strands of democratic theory, which posit that citizens have indirect control over public policies through elections and parties (Dahl 1991; Mansbridge 2003) .
Election results give certain parties or combinations of parties the potential to form governments, which in turn should shape the ideological makeup of governments and the policies they pursue.
Responsible parties that enter government have the ability and obligation to implement the principles they supported during the previous election campaign. This idea is a prominent feature of the mandate theory of democracy and the responsible party model (Downs 1957; Klingemann et al. 1994; Powell 2000) , which set out a democratic chain of command and control through which voters influence public policies. Party ideologies are an important part of this chain, because voters rely on them as cognitive devices to simplify the complexity of politics (Van der Eijk et al. 2005) . Consequently, democratic theorists expect there to be a correspondence between governing parties' ideological positions and governments' policies.
We offer theoretical and empirical contributions to research in this area. With respect to theory, we develop propositions about the conditions under which parties' ideological positions, in particular the strength of their commitment to environmental protection, affect government policies. These propositions focus on the distinction between the positions of the party of the prime minister and of the environment minister, which may differ in coalition governments, as well as the degree of centralization of the executive branch. In doing so, we seek to identify the conditions under which parties matter for policymaking (Schmidt 1996; Guinaudeau 2014) , rather than simply asking whether parties matter. The specific institutional context on which we focus, the centralization of the executive branch, has received relatively little attention until now.
Our empirical contribution is to examine the impact of parties' environmentalism on a set of uniquely comparable indicators of national governments' policies on environmental issues. We examine the policy positions taken by national governments of the member states of the European Union in EUlevel negotiations. This arena offers a set of observations in which national governments composed of parties with markedly different policy positions and domestic institutional arrangements (our key independent variables) take positions on the same specific policy issues (our dependent variable).
Most previous analyses of governments' environmental policies, as well as studies of other policy areas, were unable to draw on such directly comparable indicators, and instead focused on aggregate indicators of policy outcomes such as greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. Neumayer 2003; Scruggs 2003; Jensen and Spoon 2011) . These studies have revealed important insights. Jensen and Spoon (2011) for example find that governments that are more pro-environment and cohesive make more rapid progress toward their environmental targets than less pro-environment and cohesive governments. Outcomes are of primary concern to policymakers and citizens, but policy outputs are of primary relevance to theories of the effects of the partisan composition of government office (Knill et al. 2010, p. 302) . Outcomes such as levels of emissions are likely to be influenced by a range of factors other than the policies of national governments, including the behavior of citizens and industries.
Our work also differs from other related research that is based on aggregate indicators of policy outputs and/or relatively small numbers of observations. Some of this work has demonstrated that the ideological positions of governments and legislators affect government policies (e.g. Ward and Cao 2014) . Knill et al. (2010) examine evidence consisting of 96 observations of the number of environmental measures adopted by governments in 18 OECD countries at four time points. They find that the number of environmental measures increases when the policy positions of governing parties are more pro-environment. Their evidence also suggests that the existence of a ministerial portfolio that deals exclusively with environmental issues is associated with a greater number of environmental measures. Building on the work of Tosun (2014) , Bäck et al (2015) focused on the adoption of bans on the cultivation of GMO crops in EU member states. They found that such bans were more likely when Christian Democratic parties were in office, and particularly when they held the relevant ministerial portfolio. An unavoidable limitation of their study is that fact that there were relatively few such bans: ten in total. The fact that they found significant effects may indicate that the magnitude of such partisan variables could be substantial. Our research design is distinct in that it offers more information than previous quantitative studies on the substantive policies adopted by each government in our sample compared to other governments; we are able to rank governments relative to each other on the same specific policy issues. Moreover, the fact that we examine a greater number of observations enables us to test more refined mechanisms concerning the allocation of ministerial portfolios and executive institutions than has been possible until now.
By focusing on national governments' policy positions on proposed EU laws, our study also relates to research on governments' policies on international environmental agreements. In a previous study in this journal, Schulze (2014) demonstrated that governments composed of parties that place a greater emphasis on environmental protection were more likely to ratify global environmental agreements.
While this is an important finding, the ratification of global agreements is not the strongest test of the impact of partisanship. Downs et al. (1996) observe that states comply with international agreements because they require activities that states would have performed on their own, or because compliance requires little policy change. In contrast, by focusing on national governments' policy positions on controversial issues raised by proposed EU laws, we examine situations in which the collective decision is rarely in line with the national policy positions of all member states. This means that at least some member states are likely to have to change their national policies. Moreover, compared to international agreements, the EU has a well-developed set of compliance mechanisms at the supranational level, including the European Court of Justice. This offers a compelling test of the impact of parties' environmental positions on national governments' policies.
How Parties' Environmentalism Affects Government Policies
Ideology is commonly defined as a set of principles that help people to interpret the world as it is and how it should be (Denzau and North 2000, 24) . We conceive of parties' commitment to environmental protection as a component of their ideological positions, and differences among parties in this respect as a question of degree rather than type. This conception of parties' environmental positions is akin to the spatial conception of ideology that distinguishes among parties by their positioning on one or more dimensions that summarize the ideological principles to which they adhere (Downs 1957) . Although parties take positions on ideological dimensions in line with their historical and societal origins, they may shift positions in the process of party competition and internal party politics. The spatial approach has been dominated by references to the generic left-right dimension. The content of the left-right dimension differs among political systems, but it commonly characterizes differences of principle on the appropriate role of the state in society. Some analyses distinguish between an economic or socioeconomic left-right dimension, which refers mainly to state intervention in the economy, and the social left-right dimension, which refers to state intervention on moral issues. Hooghe et al. (2002) argue that green politics is part of a new dimension of ideological contestation: the distinction between green, alternative and libertarian principles (GAL) on the one hand and traditional, authoritarian and nationalist principles on the other (TAN).
The party family approach to ideology, by contrast, implies that ideology is a categorical variable. The family approach distinguishes among parties by the family types to which they belong: as well as green parties, conservative, social democratic, liberal, etc. (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Mair and Mudde 1998) .
The family approach captures differences and similarities among parties in terms of their principles, historical development and societal origins. With respect to green parties, the family approach highlights the distinct origins of many green parties in peace, anti-nuclear and feminist movements (Müller-Rommel and Poguntke 2002) . If we follow the general principle of maximizing variation on our independent variable, then the spatial approach is preferable because it offers more nuanced variation in ideological positioning.
1
The spatial approach to ideology is particularly appropriate when examining the impact of parties' environmental positions on governments' policies on specific environmental issues. Mainstream political parties have sought to respond to environmental concerns to varying degrees (Rohrschneider 1993; Müller-Rommel and Poguntke 2002) . Carter (2013) found that both left and right-wing mainstream parties emphasize environmental protection in their manifestos, and found some evidence that left-wing parties are more inclined to accommodate environmental concerns. Similarly, Spoon et al. (2014) found substantial variation among mainstream parties in the extent to which they have emphasized environmental protection in their manifestos. Mainstream left-wing parties, and mainstream parties that faced electorally successful green parties, place more emphasis on environmental protection. Our research examines whether such variation in parties' positions affects the policies adopted by governments when those parties are in office. The party family approach, by contrast, would examine differences among parties in terms of their categorization into different families, such as green, social democratic, Christian democratic and conservative. Although this is possible, as the work of Tosun (2014) and Bäck et al. (2015) demonstrates with interesting results, the limitation of the party-family approach is that it treats parties within the same family as equivalent, 1. The party family approach may be a better starting point for other research questions. For instance, if we wished to examine how ideology affects party members' sense of identity, then the family approach may be preferable.
while we know that they differ markedly in the degree of their commitment to environmental protection. In addition, there are relatively few cases of genuinely green parties entering government office, despite recent examples in the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland and Latvia among other places. These cases of green party government participation are worthy of study in themselves (Rüdig 2006 ), but they are too infrequent to explain the substantial variation we observe in governments' environmental policies.
We consider the environmental positions of the parties of both the prime minister and the environmental minister, which are obviously the same in single-party governments, but may differ in coalitions. An extensive theoretical literature points to the policy influence of prime ministerial parties in multi-party coalitions (e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2011) . The mechanisms through which prime ministerial parties influence policy consists of their power position relative to junior coalition members, the actions they can take during the formation of a government, and the actions they can take during the course of the governing period.
Prime ministerial parties in coalitions are usually the largest parties and hold the median legislator.
They usually lead the formation of the coalition and the government agreement, which sets out the government's policies for the next period. Prime ministerial parties can therefore select coalition partners that are likely to produce government policies congruent with their policy preferences.
Prospective prime ministerial parties also have considerable influence on the allocation and design of ministerial portfolios, which provides additional opportunities to influence government policies. One model details how prime ministerial parties can adjust the policy jurisdictions of ministerial portfolios to ensure that government policies are in line with their preferences (Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2011) .
During the course of the governing period, prime ministerial parties can use the threat of votes of confidence to exert control over their junior coalition partners (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998) . If prime ministerial parties hold a vote of confidence, this compels coalition partners to either accept the policy proposal of the prime ministerial party or the fall of the coalition. There are therefore ample reasons to expect the prime ministerial party's position on environmental protection to affect the government's environmental policies.
The party ideology of the environment minister is a separate explanatory variable in our model. According to the portfolio allocation model of coalition formation, the party of the minister responsible for any given policy area exerts most control over that area (Laver and Shepsle 1996) . One of the mechanisms through which this control is exerted consists of commitment mechanisms in relation to the coalition agreement. According to the portfolio allocation model, parties will only find a coalition agreement credible if it is backed up by the allocation of ministerial portfolios, which means that the parties controlling each portfolio get to implement their own preferred policies within their ministerial jurisdictions. A distinct mechanism through which ministers exert control concerns ministerial drift (Huber and Shipan 2002, p. 185; Martin and Vanberg 2004, p. 15-6) . Here, the argument is that parties have incentives to deviate from the agreements they reached with their coalition partners if those agreements do not perfectly reflect their preferences. The division of ministerial portfolios gives ministers advantages in terms of information and control over policies, which are opportunities to follow these incentives.
We posit that the effects of prime ministers and ministers on government policies are amplified or muted by the degree of centralization of the executive branch (Kassim et al. 2000; Kassim 2013) . The centralization of the executive refers to coordination procedures that enable the cabinet as a whole, and the chief executive in particular, to impose coherence on government policies across different areas.
While these procedures may be adjusted from time to time, they are relatively stable, institutionalized structures that tend to outlast particular governments. They encompass coordinating structures at the political and administrative levels. At the political level, relevant coordinating procedures consist of interministerial committees and/or a powerful coordinating office under the direct control of the prime minister, which enforce requirements for ministers to report to each other and the prime minister. At the administrative level, they consist of interministerial committees of senior officials. We expect the degree of executive centralization to have an important mitigating effect on the extent to which environment ministers and their parties influence the government's environmental policies. We expect environment ministers and their parties' influence to be strongest in decentralized executives and weakest in centralized executives.
Our expectations are summarized in the following propositions:
Parties' positions on the environment 1. The more pro-environmental the party of the prime minister, the stronger the government's environmental policies on specific policy issues.
2. The more pro-environmental the party of the environment minister, the stronger the government's environmental policies on specific policy issues.
Parties' positions on the environment combined with executive institutions
1. The influence of the prime minister's environmentalism on government policies is greater in centralized than in decentralized executives.
2. The influence of the environmental minister's ideological environmentalism on government policies is greater in decentralized than in centralized executives.
In addition to the variables referred to in our hypotheses, our analyses also include several control variables, including interdependence and economic development, which are mentioned in the research design. Some of these are particularly relevant to our testing ground, the European Union.
The European Union as a Testing Ground
The EU provides an appropriate testing ground for studying the impact of national parties' ideological environmentalism on their national governments' policy positions on specific environmental issues. We examine variation in the extent to which the national governments of EU member states take proenvironment policy positions on specific environmental issues when these issues are discussed in the Council of the EU. These specific environmental issues include funding for environmental programs, emission targets, and environmental standards for products. The fact that different governments take positions on the same specific environmental issues provides comparable observations for our dependent variable. EU member states vary considerably in the partisan composition of their governments and in their national policymaking institutions, as well as in levels of economic development. This provides variation in the explanatory variables referred to above.
We focus on legislative decision-making, which takes place in the context of inter-institutional negotiations involving the European Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of the EU. In this study we concentrate on the Council, in which member states are represented. However, the analyses also take into account the policy positions of the European Commission and the EP.
The Council is divided into sectoral Councils that focus on different policy areas. Given our focus on environmental policymaking, many of the specific policy issues we select were discussed partly or exclusively by the environment configuration of the Council of the EU. However, other configurations of the Council also discussed policy issues that raised environmental concerns. For instance, the fisheries ministers regularly considered conservation issues. Each configuration of the Council is affected by other parts of the Council, both horizontally and vertically. This gives environment ministers the opportunity to monitor and influence their fellow national ministers' behavior in other configurations of the Council. Below the ministerial level, many committees prepare ministers' decisions. The Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) sits at the top of this committee structure and provides for a degree of horizontal integration. Below this, there are many working groups composed of officials from each country. These officials are either based in their member states' permanent representations to the EU or in relevant national ministries. Legislative proposals are passed up and down the Council hierarchy during the decision-making process. Lower level committees may pass an issue they were unable to resolve upwards. Ministers may agree the general contours of a settlement and instruct lower level committees to work out the details. This complexity of the Council in terms of the multiple pathways of influence means that it provides a demanding test of the effect of partisan ideology on governments' policy positions.
Research Design
The data for our dependent variable --governments' policy positions on specific environmental issues --are taken from the Decision-making in the EU (DEU) project (Thomson et al. 2006; Thomson et al. 2012) . The DEU project examined 331 controversial issues from 125 legislative proposals from a range of policy areas, and we base our analyses on 55 of these issues from 27 proposals that raised environmental concerns and on which we have data on our explanatory variables.
2 The DEU project selected only those legislative proposals that carried at least some political importance and controversy, that were subject to either the consultation or the codecision procedures and from only those that arrived on the Council's agenda in the years 1999 and/or 2000, or were discussed for the first time in the Council after the 2004 enlargement.
For each of these legislative proposals, the DEU researchers conducted semi-structured interviews with key informants to describe the controversial policy issues that each proposal raised and each of the main decision-making actors' positions on each policy issue. The data on the 55 environmental issues we examine here were collected in 103 semi-structured interviews, which lasted an average of 60 minutes. Most of the interviewees (72) were officials from member states' permanent representations and included a balance of northern and southern, as well as old and new member states. The remaining interviewees were officials from the Commission (22) and the EP (9). The interviews on each proposal were held when the proposal was being discussed in the Council or soon afterwards. To elicit the positions of member states on each specific policy issue, key informants were presented with a list that included all member states and were asked to 'indicate the policy alternative initially favored by each stakeholder after the introduction of the proposal and before the Council formulated its common position.' During the course of these semi-structured interviews, each issue was represented in the form of a policy scale, ranging from 0 to 100, which referred to the most extreme positions taken on the issue. is important because waste recovery operations are permitted to handle imported waste and also go towards meeting recovery targets set by other EU legislation. As mentioned above, during the data collection each policy issue was represented as a scale from 0 to 100. The environmental issues were coded so that position 100 on the scale is the 'greenest' position. On the incineration issue, the green position is that incineration should not be classed as recovery under any circumstances. At the opposite end of the scale, on position 0, is the 'brown' position that most incinerators could be classed as recovery operations. Three other alternatives were put forward, and key informants placed these between the outlying positions to reflect the political distances between them. The main political difference was between the EP that favored the continuation of the status quo, which meant that no incineration is classed as waste (position 100), and member states and the Commission that wished to classify incineration as recovery at least if certain conditions were met. The outcome was more in line with the positions of the member states and Commission than with the position of the EP.
The second issue in Table 1 for their manifestos immediately prior to the date on which the legislative proposal was introduced. The original CMP measures are highly skewed. We therefore take the natural log of these original measures, after adding one so as to obtain values for parties that devote none of their manifesto to environmentalism and to avoid the steepest part of the logarithmic function between zero and one (See Table A .2 of the online appendix for descriptive statistics). 5 As part of our robustness tests, we apply Benoit et al's. (2009) approach to modeling uncertainty in CMP estimates and find that our results hold.
4. Figure A .1 in the online appendix illustrates the distribution of the original positional variable and the three-category ordinal variable we use. 5. Our measures of the ideological environmentalism of the prime ministerial and environment ministerial parties are not highly correlated (r=.34). We also perform separate analysis on the cases in which the ideological environmentalism of the prime minister's and environment minister's parties differ.
To measure the centralization of the executive branch, we refer to Kassim's (2013) Our control variables incorporate the effects of interdependence, in the sense that the policy of any given government may depend on the policies of other governments and European institutions. We count the number of member states (excluding the member state in the case in question) that took the strongest environmental position on each issue. This variable has a value of zero for all states on the issues of waste incineration and waste prevention targets (Table 1) , since only the EP took the strongest environmental position. On the issue of recycling, it has a value of five for all states with the exception of Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Spain, for which it has a value of four. Excluding the member state referred to in the dependent variable in each case from the count of strongest environmental positions ensures we do not include the same information on both sides of the equation in our statistical model. We also include variables that control for whether the Commission and EP took the strongest environmental position. These do not feature in our expectations, but are appropriate control variables in the context of EU decision-making. We also control for GDP per capita, since we expect states with higher levels of GDP to have more environmentally friendly policies. We employ Eurostat data on GDP per inhabitant in Euros in the year in which the legislative proposal in question was introduced. The GDP data are divided by 1,000 and are in 2009 prices. The GDP per capita variable is also skewed, and we therefore take the natural log of it.
6. Kassim (2013) also distinguishes among systems on the basis of whether their coordination ambition is comprehensive or selective, which indicates whether or not coordination is confined to nationally salient issues. Since all our cases refer to controversial issues, they are nationally salient to at least some extent; we therefore do not include this second dimension.
Analysis
Multinomial logit models are presented in Table 2 rather than ordered logit models because the data violate the parallel regression assumption of ordered logit. 7 The coefficients estimate the effect of changes in the explanatory variables on the likelihood that states take intermediate versus weak environmental positions (1 vs. 0) and strong versus weak environmental positions (2 vs. 0). Table 2 7. The Brant Test was applied to the ordered logit version the second model in Table 2 , and this indicated that the parallel regression assumption was violated (Χ² for all coefficients together of 256.24, p=00).
Model 1 in
The magnitudes and significance of the effects from Model 2 are depicted in Figure 1 . In line with the above interpretation, the effect of the prime ministerial party's environmental positions is positive and differs significantly from zero in centralized systems for the comparison between the strongest and weakest government policies. In decentralized systems by contrast, there is no effect of the prime ministerial party's environmental positions. The opposite is true of the effects for environment ministers. Environment ministers' positions also affect the likelihood that governments adopt intermediate versus weak environmental policies. Figure 1 adds that for both prime ministers and environment ministers there is a significant difference between their effects in the two domestic institutional contexts of centralized and decentralized executives with respect to the likelihood that governments adopt she strongest versus the weakest environmental policies.
The effects found in Model 2 are depicted as predicted probabilities in Figure 2 , holding other variables constant at their means (for continuous variables) or modes (for dichotomous variables). Figure 2 shows that for a state with a centralized executive and prime ministerial party with the lowest level of commitment to environmental protection (a value of 0), the probability it takes the weakest environmental position on a specific environmental issue is .64. This probability falls to .37 for a similar state with a prime ministerial party with the highest observed level of commitment to environmental protection (a value of 2.6 or approximately 13% of the manifesto focused on "environmental protection"). At the same time, the probability of taking the strongest ideological position on a specific environmental issue increases from .07 to .40. In other words, states with centralized executives and prime ministerial parties with low levels of commitment to environmental protection are more likely to take weak than strong environmental positions on specific issues. By contrast, if those states have prime ministerial parties with strong pro-environment positions, they are just as likely to take strong rather than weak environmental positions on specific issues.
[ INSERT FIGURE 2 ]
Figure 2 depicts a similar pattern for the effect of environment ministers in states with decentralized executives. At the lowest level of commitment to environmental protection observed in our sample (a value of 0), the probability that such a state takes the weakest environmental position on a specific issue is .76, while the probability of taking the strongest position is a minuscule .05. By contrast, if a state with a decentralized executive has an environment minister whose party has the strongest proenvironment position (a value of 3.82 or approximately 44% of the manifesto focused on "environmental protection"), then the probability it takes the strongest environmental position on a specific issue leaps to .37, rising above the probability that such a state would take the weakest environmental position on a specific issue (.33).
8 Table 2 We tested the robustness of our findings to different model specifications and present the most important of these in more detail in the online appendix. Our main findings concerning parties' ideologies and executive centralization are robust to methods including the use of multilevel models to capture issue heterogeneity, tests to incorporate uncertainty in the CMP measures (Benoit et al. (2009), tests to identify whether any single state was driving the results and simulated error in Kassim's categorization of national executives as either centralized or decentralized.
8. The Italian FdV Green Federation represents the most 'ideologically environmental' party in our observations. The Italian Greens produced party manifestos that emphasized environmental protection at a consistently high level across most of the manifestos reviewed by the CMP project (up to 44% in the mid to late 1990s). Re-estimating Model 2 from Table 2 while omitting the Italian FdV Green Federation does not significantly alter our coefficient estimates.
Conclusions
The extent to which governing parties favor environmental protection, as measured by their electoral appeals, affects the strength of their governments' policies on specific environmental issues. This suggests that in addition to adopting green rhetoric, parties do at least, to some extent, follow through with green policies when they enter government office. Green politics is an integral part of political competition in modern democracies with mainstream parties espousing support for environmentalism to varying degrees (Rohrschneider 1993; Hooghe et al. 2002; Müller-Rommel 2002; Müller-Rommel and Poguntke 2002; Carter 2013; Cao et al. 2014; Spoon et al. 2014) . Our findings add to a growing body of comparative studies that examine the effects of parties' commitment to environmental protection on governments' environmental policies (e.g. Knill et al. 2010; Schulze 2014; Ward and Cao 2014; Bäck et al. 2015) .
Our work offers theoretical and empirical contributions to existing scholarship. With respect to theory, we contribute to knowledge concerning the conditions under which parties matter (Schmidt 1996; Guinaudeau 2014) , and the particular condition on which we focus is the centralization of the executive, which has received little attention until now. We posited and found evidence for the proposition that in centralized executives the party of the prime minister affects policy, while in decentralized executives the party of the environment minister affects policy. This finding is relevant to theoretical and empirical work that examines the distribution of ministerial portfolios across a range of policy areas (Laver and Shepsle 1996; Goodhart 2013) Other relevant lines of research examine the constraints imposed on ministers by legislative actors (e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2005; Strøm et al. 2010) . Specifying the institutional conditions under which governing parties affect policies is relevant to environmental policies, as well as policies in other areas.
The empirical contribution was to develop a research design that offers comparable measures of governments' policies on the same specific issues. This allowed us to compare the strength of different governments' policies on the same issues and to include a large enough number of observations with which to examine the institutional conditions under which prime ministers' and environment ministers' party affiliations affect policies. We argued that EU environmental policy is an appropriate testing ground for our propositions. This raises the empirical question of the extent to which our findings are generalizable to other policy areas in the EU and to policies outside the EU. It has been argued that the development of policymaking at the level of the European Union has empowered national chief executives at the expense of other actors in national governments and at the domestic level (Johansson and Tallberg 2010). This might suggest that chief executives have weaker effects and ministers have stronger effects on policies in countries and policy areas outside the EU. We would therefore welcome extensions of similar research designs to other arenas with the aim of formulating and testing theoretical propositions on the conditions under which parties affect policies.
Greener governments: Partisan ideologies, institutions and environmental policies Online Appendix
This online appendix provides more detail on the environmental policy issues included in the analysis (Table A. 1), the descriptive statistics for the analysis (Table A. The first of these robustness tests, reported in Table A .3, replicates Model 2 of Table 2 using paired, multilevel logit models with random intercepts to account for the fact that our observations are nested within issues. 9 While a multilevel approach is appealing because it allows us to account for the nested nature of our observations, it also carries with it additional modeling assumptions that are problematic given our data (e.g. non-independence of issues, proposals and/or states). 10 The results of this first robustness test are consistent with those from our multinomial test in Table 2 although with slightly weakened significance levels, which is likely due to the much smaller number of observations in these paired logits. These paired logit models were run using the simex package in R created by Lederer and Küchenhoff (2013) that implements the SIMEX algorithm of Cook and Stefanski (1994) . 11 The most relevant coefficients in these models refer to the effects of parties' environmentalism. As in the main analyses, the environmentalism of prime ministers' parties affects governments' positions in centralized executives, while the environmentalism of environmental ministers' parties matters in decentralized executives most clearly in the "2 vs 0" comparison.
A third robustness test was run to determine if any single state was driving our main results. Model 2 of Table 2 was run 27 times, each time dropping a single member state from the analysis while recording the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the PM, environment minister and their interaction terms with the centralization variable. The results from 26 of the 27 regressions were consistent with our main findings. The only exception was that removing Denmark from the sample pushed the significance of the interaction term with the PM's environmentalism to p<.13.
A fourth robustness test was run to gauge the effect of possible errors in Kassim's categorization of national executives as either centralized or decentralized. Model 2 of Table 2 was run 27 times, each time assuming that one of the member states had been miscategorized along this measure of centralization. 24 of the 27 regressions maintained a significant effect for the interaction between the PM's environmentalism and centralization (exceptions being Belgium, Denmark and Italy). All 27 regressions maintained a significant effect for the environmental minister's environmentalism and only one regression, that miscategorizing Italy, pushed the significance of the interaction term with the environment minister beyond a standard significance threshold (p<.10).
In sum, all of these alternative specifications provide support for our main finding on the effect of parties' commitment to environmental protection on government policies: the environmentalism of prime ministerial parties positively affects on the likelihood that governments take stronger environmental positions in centralized executives, while the environmentalism of environmental ministers' parties have positive effects in decentralized executives. (COD/1999/127) • Note: Left: probabilities of governments with centralized executives taking the strongest and weakest environmental positions given prime ministers with di↵erent levels of pro-environment ideology. Right: same for governments with decentralized executives given environment ministers with di↵erent levels of proenvironment ideology. Model specified in Table 2 , Model 2 with pro-environment ideology varied from lowest to highest observed values, while other variables held at their means (for continuous variables) or modes (for dichotomous variables). A bootstrap procedure is applied to estimate 90% confidence intervals. Note: †p<0.10; ⇤ p<0.05; ⇤⇤ p<0.01. Paired logit models with random e↵ects at the level of issues using "lme4" package in R (Bates et al. 2014) . 0: weakest; 1: intermediate; and 2: strongest pro-environment position on specific issues. Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov (2009) . Models estimated using the SIMEX package in R by Lederer and Kchenho↵ (2013) that implements the SIMEX algorithm of Cook and Stefanski (1994) . 0: weakest; 1: intermediate; and 2: strongest pro-environment position on specific issues.
